If you followed the Black Lives Matter protests during the past months, you might have come across some influencers or even parliament representatives sharing these types of information.
In this image, one information particularly strikes out to a law student: the “don’t bring your phone without first turning off Face/Touch ID”. Didn’t that jump out at you? Of course, this was posted by Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez, so you might think this is only relevant in the US. As it turns out, this can also affect you elsewhere! In the Netherlands, in February 2019 a court of first instance ruled that a police officer was allowed to take the thumb of a suspect and place it on the smartphone to unlock it and secure the information/data that it contains in order to facilitate an investigation.
From this, many questions arise. This article will try to shed light on the following ones. First, when can the police officers do this? What principles of criminal procedure can these actions potentially infringe? What do those principles aim to protect?
In 2017, in the “Smartphone” judgement, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled that when a suspect is arrested and his belongings are seized, the investigating officer does not require prior judicial review or intervention of the public prosecutor (basically, without review from any higher authority that would normally be necessary for a police officer to hack into your computer or cell phone in general) in order to obtain access to data stored or available in the seized good/ phone. This means that when an individual is arrested for whatever reason and a phone has been seized during the arrest, the police officer does not need any authorisation by higher authorities to access data. Why is it so?
If the infringement of privacy related to the investigation can be regarded as limited, some very broad articles (art 94,95,96 Wetboek van Strafvordering) give the police the authority to access the data on a phone seized during arrestation. This may be the case if the investigation simply consists in consulting a small number of certain data stored or available on a smartphone. If that investigation is such that it provides a more or less complete picture of certain aspects of the personal life of the suspect, then the previously mentioned article is not a sufficient legal basis to authorize such intrusion. (but… where do we draw the line?). This may in particular be the case when it concerns the examination of all data stored or available on the smartphone.
The Court justified the action (i.e. placing the thumb of the suspect on the phone), declaring that it complied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality considering the seriousness and nature of the suspicions against the suspect, the lack of his cooperation in unlocking the iPhone and the justified expectation by the investigating officers that the iPhone contains relevant data for the investigation. In other words, the intrusiveness was proportionate to the nature and seriousness of the suspicion against the suspect and because a less drastic means of unlocking the iPhone was not available. In the precedent at hand, the reporter put handcuffs on the suspect and then placed the thumb on the iPhone. This led to the conclusion that a forced access to a smartphone with the use of the suspect's fingerprint is lawful in given circumstances. In addition, the fingerprint was obtained with a very low degree of coercion.
Unlike the situation where the suspect is forced to provide the access code of his phone, which requires a statement from the suspect, placing the suspect's thumb on his iPhone does not, in the opinion of the Court, infringe the nemo tenetur- principle, the right to not incriminate yourself. Let us go through this. First, simply put, this principle consists in not having to be forced to give information that could be held against oneself in court. You might think though, that being forced to give a thumb to the police officers to help them hack a phone is self-incriminating and illegal then, based on the definition. However, the European Court of Human Rights (a court that holds major precedents when it comes to criminal procedure) drew a distinction between information that is will-dependent and will-independent. The latter are inter alia, urine, blood, fingerprint. A classical example is the one of Jalloh case where the German police force forcibly extracted a bag of cocaine hidden in the suspect’s rectum (Jalloh case). The court concluded that the existence of the bag of cocaine was will-independent. In other words, the police can forcibly extract incriminating information/objects from the suspect if the object’s existence is not dependent on the will of the suspect. The former is everything that is not will-independent. Going back to the fingerprint, its existence is not dependent on the will of the suspect. Therefore, forcibly putting the thumb of the suspect on the phone does not go against the principle of non-self-incrimination because the existence of the fingerprint is not will-dependent. In the contrary, the existence of a log-in code is dependent on the will of the suspect and can therefore not forcibly be extracted from the suspect’s mind. Nemo tenetur is not to be confused with the right to remain silent. The former, includes the right not to be ordered to hand over documents for example, which is much broader than the latter.
After all, reliability is at stake in statements obtained under duress, because these statements were not made in freedom. When pressured, a person is more likely to give in to the interrogator's demands. In addition, the principle of safeguarding the presumption of innocence holds in that the burden of proof lies with the prosecuting authority and that arbitrary unauthorized coercion is not applied.
In conclusion, while you might believe the post of AOC is only relevant in the United States, it could in some situations impact you here in the Netherlands and in some places in Europe.